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Inversions under Section 7874 of the
Internal Revenue Code: Flawed
Legislation, Flawed Guidance
Jefferson P. VanderWolk
The Obama Administration's international tax proposals would, if
enacted, be likely to increase the U.S. tax costs of many multinational
groups that are owned by a U.S. entity.' One possible response by the
managers or owners of such a group would be to restructure the group via
an inversion transaction so that the group would have a foreign corporate
parent instead of a US parent entity.
Inversions were in vogue in the late 1990s and the early years of this
decade until Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,2
adding section 7874 to the Internal Revenue Code. The new law effectively
negated the tax benefits of inversions into tax haven parent corporations
where the ownership of the group was not significantly affected by the
restructuring. If, on the other hand, there was a significant change in
ownership and if the change was not due to a public offering of shares in
the foreign corporation, the new law sought only to impose U.S. tax on
gains accrued by the U.S. parent up to the date of expatriation without being
offset by foreign tax credits or net operating loss carryovers. If the group
had substantial business activities in the foreign corporation's country of
incorporation, the new law would not apply.
The language of section 7874 raised a number of issues requiring
guidance from the IRS and the Treasury Department in order to prevent
absurd results. The statute also contained unclear terms needing
clarification in regulations. In addition, the statute empowered the IRS and
Treasury to write regulations "to prevent the avoidance of the purposes" of
the section.5 This power has been exercised several times.6
1 James Reardon & Jon Ohm, The Practical Effects of the Obama International Tax
Proposals, 2009 TAx NOTES TODAY 171-76 (2009).
2 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
See T.D. 9238, 2006-1 C.B. 408.
4 For example, under I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006), an inversion is not subject to the
statute if, after the transaction, the controlled group "does not have substantial business
activities in the foreign country in which, or under the law of which, the entity is created or
organized, when compared to the total business activities of [the] group."
' I.R.C. § 7874(g) (2005).
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Section 7874 is widely believed to have had a severe chilling effect on
inversions of publicly held corporations, but these inversions may stage a
comeback. In addition to potentially increased tax costs due to new
international tax rules, factors such as reduced unrealized gains due to the
economic downturn of 2008-2009 and rapid growth in foreign markets
might lead to more inversions in the future. It is timely, therefore, to review
the workings of section 7874 and the guidance issued by the IRS and the
Treasury Department on major issues arising under the statute.
Part 1 of this article will introduce the statute and discuss its legislative
history. Part 2 will explain in more detail how the statute works. Part 3
will critically discuss particular guidance issued in 2009 relating to the
ownership-change determination. Part 4 will discuss the business-activities
test, regulatory guidance on its application, and the implications of the
subsequent elimination of much of that guidance. Part 5 contains
concluding observations.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE STATUTE AND ITS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
Section 7874 applies when a foreign corporation (FC) acquires the
stock or assets of a domestic corporation or partnership (UST) if both of the
following conditions are satisfied: (1) at least 60% of the stock of FC is
owned, after the acquisition, by former owners of UST by reason of their
former ownership; and (2) the corporate group controlled by FC after the
acquisition does not have business activities in FC's country of
incorporation that are substantial when compared to the total business
activities of the group worldwide. If the level of ownership continuity is
between 60% and 80%, the statute imposes a special gain recognition
requirement on UST and any related domestic entities for the ten-year
period following the acquisition. If the level of ownership continuity is
80% or more, the statute does not impose the special gain recognition
requirement, but instead deems FC to be a domestic corporation for all
purposes of the Code.
Section 7874 was enacted after Congress had become aware that a
number of multinational businesses owned by U.S. parent entities had been
restructured in order to have a foreign corporation (typically incorporated in
a tax haven such as Bermuda) be the owner of the business going forward.'
The former U.S. parent entity, or its assets, would be acquired by the new
foreign parent (i.e., FC), which would be owned, at least in part, by the
same owners who had previously owned the former U.S. parent entity (i.e.,
6 See T.D. 9238, 2006-1 C.B. 408; T.D. 9265, 2006-2 C.B. 1; T.D. 9399, 2008-1 C.B.
1157; T.D. 9453, 2008-28 I.R.B. 114 (2009).
7 See, e.g., David Cay Johnson, US. Corporations Are Using Bermuda to Slash Tax Bills,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al; U.S. Firm Ditches Tax Dodge, B.B.C. NEWS, Aug. 2,
2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/2167602.stm.
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UST).'
The non-U.S. subsidiaries in the group could then be transferred to FC,
thus removing their future earnings from the U.S. tax base. Also, FC or its
foreign subsidiaries would be able to erode the U.S. tax base by making
loans or licensing foreign-owned intangibles to the U.S. members of the
group. Many members of Congress viewed such business expatriations
motivated by tax avoidance as unpatriotic and unacceptable.9 A number of
anti-inversion bills were introduced in 2002 and 2003,o but no legislation
on the issue was passed until the enactment of section 7874 as part of the
Jobs Act in 2004.
Section 7874 is a hybrid, incorporating the anti-inversion approaches
of both the House bill and the Senate bill that were combined to produce the
Jobs Act." The Senate bill provided for FC to be treated as a domestic
corporation in cases of 80% or more continuity of ownership and for UST
to be subject to the special gain reconition rules for ten years in cases of
50% to 80% continuity of ownership. The House bill, in contrast, would
have respected FC as a foreign corporation in all cases and subjected UST
to the special gain recognition rule in cases of at least 60% continuity of
ownership.13
Both bills gave a free pass to transactions where FC is incorporated in
a country in which the group has substantial business activities in
comparison to the group's worldwide business activities.14
Regarding the continuity-of-ownership calculation, both bills provided
for the disregard of stock of FC sold in a public offering related to the
inversion.15 The Senate bill, however, also provided for the disregard of
stock of FC sold in a private placement related to the inversion.16 This was
dropped from the final legislation.
The committee reports are surprisingly brief regarding the purposes of
8 In the simplest form of inversion, the UST would establish FC as a new foreign
corporation, and the shareholders of UST would then contribute their shares of UST to FC in
exchange for stock of FT. This is sometimes referred to as a "flip" transaction.
9 See, e.g., John D. McKinnon, Senators Plan to Curb Relocations to Bermuda, Other
Tax Havens, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A4.
10 See, e.g., Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002, H.R. 3884, 107th Cong. (2002);
Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002, H.R. 4756, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4993, 106th Cong.
(2000); American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5095,
107th Cong.
" American Jobs Creation Act of 2003, H.R. 2896, 108th Cong. § 601; Jumpstart our
Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 441 (2003).
12 S. 1637.
1 H.R. 2896.
14 See supra note 11.
15 Id.
16 S. 1637. The words "or private placement" followed the words "public offering" in the
provision that became I.R.C. § 7874(c)(2)(B).
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the section. The entire "Reasons for Change" section of the Senate Finance
Committee's Report is as follows:
The Committee believes that inversion transactions resulting in a
minimal presence in a foreign country of incorporation are a means
of avoiding U.S. tax and should be curtailed. In particular, these
transactions permit corporations and other entities to continue to
conduct business in the same manner as they did prior to the
inversion, but with the result that the inverted entity avoids U.S. tax
on foreign operations and may engage in earnings-stripping
techniques to avoid U.S. tax on domestic operations. The Committee
believes that certain inversion transactions (involving 80 percent or
greater identity of stock ownership) have little or no non-tax effect or
purpose and should be disregarded for U.S. tax purposes. The
Committee believes that other inversion transactions (involving
greater than 50 but less than 80 percent identity of stock ownership)
may have sufficient non-tax effect and purpose to be respected, but
warrant heightened scrutiny and other restrictions to ensure that the
U.S. tax base is not eroded through related-party transactions.17
The corresponding section of the House Ways and Means Committee's
report is quite different:
The Committee believes that corporate inversion transactions are a
symptom of larger problems with our current uncompetitive system
for taxing U.S.-based global businesses and are also indicative of the
unfair advantages that our tax laws convey to foreign ownership.
The bill addresses the underlying problems with the U.S. system for
taxing its global businesses and contains several provisions to
remove the incentives for entering into inversion transactions.
Imposing full U.S. tax on gains of companies undertaking an
inversion transaction is one such provision that helps to remove the
incentive to enter into an inversion transaction.
The Conference Report and the Joint Committee on Taxation's "Blue
Book" say nothing further about the purposes of section 7874.19
The Senate Finance Committee's report indicates that the perceived
mischief had two elements. One was the fact that the group could
"continue to conduct business in the same manner as they did prior to the
inversion," but with reduced US tax exposure. 20 The other element was the
"7 S. REP. No. 108-192, at 142 (2003).
18 WILLIAM M. THOMAS, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. REP. No. 108-393, at 163
(2003).
'9 H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 568 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); Joint Committee on Taxation,
General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 108th Congress, at 343 (May 2005).
20 S. REP. No. 108-192, at 142.
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group's "minimal presence" in FC's country of incorporation. 21 Thus, the
legislators viewed some inversions as involving a mere change of form with
little or no substantive economic effect in cases where the group's
ownership did not change by more than 20%, and the group's presence in
FC's country of incorporation was minimal. In such cases, the statute
would eliminate any U.S. tax benefit from the transaction by treating FC as
a U.S. corporation.
In contrast, it was decided that FC should be respected as a foreign
corporation for U.S. tax purposes if there was either a bigger change of
ownership or a more-than-minimal presence of the group in FC's country of
incorporation. The report indicates that the Senate believed these
transactions would have a sufficient non-tax effect to justify being respected
for U.S. tax purposes. Cases involving minimal presence in the foreign
country and an ownership change of at least 50% but less than 80% would
be subjected to "heightened scrutiny and other restrictions to ensure that the
U.S. tax base is not eroded through related-party transactions."2 2
The House Ways and Means Committee's report signals agreement
with the Senate on the last point only, and even that is only partial
agreement since the House bill had a 60% threshold rather than 50%, and
made no distinction between cases on either side of the 80% ownership
change line.
Despite the importance of the ownership-change percentage to the
policy underlying section 7874, the committee reports say nothing about the
reason for disregarding stock of FC sold in a public offering related to the
inversion. A plausible guess is that the legislators felt that a widely
dispersed group of new shareholders would not have a significant effect on
the conduct of the group's business. It would follow by implication that the
conference committee thought that a small group of new investors who
privately acquired more than 20% ownership might have a significant effect
on the conduct of the business.
II. THE WORKINGS OF SECTION 7874
Section 7874 begins with the operative provision for covered
inversions with an ownership change of at least 60% but less than 80%:
"The taxable income of an expatriated entity for any taxable year [in the
ten-year period following the completion of the inversion transaction] shall
in no event be less than the inversion gain of the entity for the taxable
year."23
Inversion gain is defined as "the income or gain recognized by reason
21 id.
22 id.
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of the transfer during the [ten-year] period of stock or other properties by an
expatriated entity, and any income received or accrued during the [ten-year]
period by reason of a license of any property by an expatriated entity .. . as
part of the [inversion transaction], or . .. after [it] if the transfer or license is
to a foreign related person." 24
Expatriated entity is defined in paragraph (2)(A) as a "domestic
corporation or partnership . .. with respect to which a foreign corporation is
a surrogate foreign corporation".25
Surrogate foreign corporation is then defined in paragraph (2)(B). In
broad terms, a surrogate foreign corporation is a foreign corporation that
has acquired all of the stock or assets of a domestic corporation or
partnership if after the acquisition at least 60% of the foreign corporation's
stock is owned by former shareholders or partners of the domestic entity by
reason of their holding stock or partnership interests in the domestic entity,
and the group does not have business operations in the foreign acquirer's
country of incorporation that are substantial compared to the worldwide
operations of the group.26
Thus, the surrogate foreign corporation is FC, the new foreign parent;
the expatriated entity is UST, the former U.S. parent; and the inversion gain
is the income and gain of UST and its U.S. affiliates which arises from
transfers to foreign related persons.
While the foregoing sections seem clear, the statute gets more
complicated. Subsection (b) provides for a foreign corporation to be treated
as a domestic corporation if it would be a surrogate foreign corporation if
the 60% continuity-of-ownership requirement were changed to 80%.
Another provision prevents subsection (b) cases from being affected by the
inversion-gain inclusion rule of subsection (a).
The statute includes several so-called "special rules." One is the
public-offering rule: for purposes of determining continuity of ownership,
no account shall be taken of stock of FC "which is sold in a public offering"
related to the inversion transaction.2 7 Another rule disregards any transfers
of properties or liabilities "if such transfers are part of a plan a principal
purpose of which is to avoid the purposes of this section."2 8
Congress made two separate grants of regulatory authority to the IRS
and Treasury in section 7874. The more narrow grant was "to prescribe
24 I.R.C. § 7874(d)(2) (2006). Additional provisions limit the taxpayer's ability to use
foreign tax credits and net operating losses to reduce the taxation of inversion gain. I.R.C. §
7874(e)(1), (3) (2006).
25 I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006). A United States person related to an expatriated
entity under section 267(b) or 707(b)(1) of the Code is also an expatriated entity under
section 7874(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
26 I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (2006).
27 I.R.C. § 7874(c)(2)(B) (2006).
28 I.R.C. § 7874(c)(4) (2006).
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such regulations as may be appropriate to determine whether a corporation
is a surrogate foreign corporation, including regulations (A) to treat
warrants, options, contracts to acquire stock, convertible debt interests, and
other similar interests as stock, and (B) to treat stock as not stock." 29 The
broader grant was for
such regulations as are necessary to carry out this section, including
regulations providing for such adjustments to the application of this
section as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of
this section, including the avoidance of such purposes through (1)
the use of related persons, pass-through or other noncorporate
entities, or other intermediaries, or (2) transactions designed to have
persons cease to be (or not become) members of [corporate groups]
or related persons.30
III. THE OWNERSHIP-CHANGE TEST AND THE PUBLIC-
OFFERING RULE: NOTICE 2009-78
On September 17, 2009, the IRS and Treasury announced, in Notice
2009-7831 (the "Notice"), that for purposes of determining the percentage of
FC stock that is held by former owners of UST, they will disregard FC
stock issued in an offering related to FC's acquisition of UST if the stock is
issued in exchange for cash or highly liquid assets, regardless of whether
the FC stock is issued in a public offering or a private placement.3 2
Specifically, stock issued in exchange for "nonqualified property" will
be disregarded under forthcoming regulations. Nonqualified property is
defined as cash or cash equivalents, marketable securities, and "any other
property acquired in a transaction with a principal purpose of avoiding the
purposes of section 7874."33
The Notice describes a transaction that is said to be "intended to avoid
the application of section 7874":34
The shareholders of [UST] transfer all their [UST] stock to [FC] in
exchange for 79 percent of the stock of [FC] and, in a related
transaction, an investor transfers cash to [FC] in exchange for the
remaining 21 percent of the [FC] stock.... [T]he parties assert that
the investor's [FC] stock would be taken into account for purposes of
[determining the percentage of FC owned by former owners of UST
by reason of their ownership of UST stock]. Thus, the former
shareholders of UST would hold only 79 percent of the stock of FC
29 I.R.C. § 7874(b)(6) (2006).
o I.R.C. § 7874(g) (2006).
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by reason of holding stock of UST, in which case section 7874(a)(1)
would apply to UST (and any other expatriated entity) but section
7874(b) would not apply to treat [FC] as a domestic corporation for
purposes of the Code. ... [This] is inconsistent with the purposes of
section 7874.ss
No explanation is given for the conclusion that taking the new
investor's stock into account is inconsistent with the purposes of section
7874. In fact, nowhere in the Notice are the purposes of section 7874
summarized or otherwise stated. It is puzzling also that the Notice first
asserts that the transaction is intended to avoid the application of section
7874 but then states that the taxpayer takes the position that section
7874(a)(1) is applicable to UST and any other expatriated entity. It may be
argued that notices issued by Treasury and the IRS do not have to provide
explanations, but if a Notice asserts that a scenario is inconsistent with the
purposes of a statutory provision, it does not seem unreasonable to expect
that some indication of the rationale for the assertion will be provided.
The transaction appears to be intended to avoid the application of
section 7874(b), but not 7874(a)(1), by limiting the percentage of
continuing ownership to 79%. This is qualitatively different from
avoidance of the section. As discussed further below, if the new investor's
interest in FC is a genuine 21% equity interest not limited by any kind of
restrictions on the investor's rights, then the application of section
7874(a)(1) is fully consistent with the statutory purpose.
Two additional examples are given in the Notice, describing direct and
indirect exchanges of marketable securities for stock of the new foreign
parent and stating the conclusion that the latter stock will be disregarded
under the future regulations. In the second example, which involves the
indirect exchange, a reason is given for the conclusion: "because a principal
purpose of such issuance is the avoidance of the purposes of section
7874." 3 This is odd, as the examples contain no information on ownership
percentages, and thus it is impossible to tell whether section 7874 would
apply or not if the stock were not disregarded .
What might be the thinking behind the Notice? Regarding the
example with a 79%-21% split of the ownership of FC, one's initial
35 id.
36 id.
3 Separately, the Notice states that the IRS and Treasury will not rely on the public-
offering rule to disregard FC stock issued in exchange for publicly traded stock of a foreign
target company that is acquired by FC at the same time as FC's acquisition of UST's stock
or assets. Again, no explanation is given other than a simple statement that disregarding the
FC stock and treating FC as a domestic corporation in these circumstances "could be
inappropriate in certain cases." Id. This is clearly correct since it would be a semantic
stretch to treat stock issued to target shareholders in exchange for their stock in the target as
stock "sold in a public offering," and there would be no policy reason to do so in any case.
706
Inversions under Section 7874
30:699 (2010)
reaction is that the IRS and Treasury presumably felt that there was no
policy reason to treat a 79% case and an 80% case differently, and that they
had sufficiently broad regulatory authority to write a rule treating the two
cases the same way. The initial reaction does not explain, however, the fact
that the rule stated in the Notice would apply to cases in which the actual
change of ownership was much larger than 21%. Indeed, the rule is not
limited even to cases of continuing ownership of a majority stake in FC; it
could apply in a case in which 99% of FC was owned by new investors.
Thus, it appears that the IRS and Treasury must have concluded that their
regulatory authority was broad enough to allow them to disregard stock
issued in exchange for cash or highly liquid assets in all cases on the theory
that such an exchange might result in an FC-owned structure that was not
caught by section 7874(b) but was economically similar to one that would
have been caught-namely, an FC wholly owned by former UST
shareholders and carrying on the same business minus only some cash or
highly liquid assets.
It does not appear, however, when one looks carefully at the purposes
of section 7874 as expressed in both the language of the statute and the
legislative history that the IRS and Treasury actually have so much
regulatory authority.
First, Congress decided that there was a policy reason to treat an
inversion with 79% continuity of ownership differently from an inversion
with 80% continuity of ownership except in cases where the discontinuity
was the result of a public offering. The 80% test is a bright-line test.
Bright-line tests always give rise to the policy question of why cases that
are very close to the line on either side should be treated differently. As a
matter of practicality, however, a line often needs to be drawn, and people
need to know exactly where the line is. A bright line inevitably enables
people to arrange their affairs so as to be on one side of the line or the other,
depending on which treatment they prefer. The U.S. Supreme Court has
noted that "the very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally
may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it."38
Of course, the question of whether a bright line has been passed must
be answered by looking at the substance of the matter and not merely the
form. For example, section 957 of the Code defines "controlled foreign
corporation" using a bright-line 50% stock ownership test (by either value
or voting power). 9 The regulations under section 957 provide that "any
38 Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930) (citing
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1916)). In the tax area, the Supreme Court
expressed a similar view in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) ("The legal right
of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether
avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted."). For the quotation from
Superior Oil Co., I am indebted to the unnamed author of Drawing Lines Around Corporate
Inversion, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2270, 2270 (2005).
39 I.R.C. § 957(a) (2006).
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arrangement to shift formal voting power away from United States
shareholders of a foreign corporation will not be given effect if in reality
voting power is retained" and go on to provide illustrative examples.4 0 This
was an entirely appropriate bit of rule-making by the IRS and Treasury.
It would not have been permissible for the IRS and Treasury to write
regulations under section 957 treating a foreign corporation as a controlled
foreign corporation if it is 49.9% owned by United States shareholders
when in reality those shareholders merely have 49.9% of the voting power
and value of the company's stock. Similarly, it is not appropriate to treat
the 79%-21% example in the Notice as an 80% case simply because 79% is
very close to 80%, and it can be inferred that 79% was chosen as part of a
plan to have the inversion fall under section 7874(a)(1) rather than section
7874(b). Provided that the new investor's stock in FC gives the investor a
genuine 21% equity interest in the group, reducing the former owners'
interest to 79% in substance, there is no basis for concluding that the
treatment provided for under the plain language of the statute is in conflict
with legislative intent.
The IRS and Treasury issued the Notice in reliance on the grants of
regulatory authority in section 7874, which allow for regulations "to
determine whether a foreign corporation is a surrogate foreign corporation"
and "to carry out this section, including regulations providing for such
adjustments to the application of this section as are necessary to prevent the
avoidance of the purposes of this section." 4 1 These provisions, as well as
the rule which disregards any transfers made as part of a plan a principal
purpose of which is to avoid the purposes of section 7874,4 are cited in the
background section of the Notice.
Let's consider each grant of authority in turn. First, does the authority
to write rules "to determine whether a corporation is a surrogate foreign
corporation" give the IRS and Treasury a blank sheet of paper on which to
write a new definition of "surrogate foreign corporation?" 3 The answer
must be no. The phrase "surrogate foreign corporation" has no meaning
outside of section 7874. The only basis for determining what is a surrogate
foreign corporation is the language of section 7874(a)(2)(B). The
regulatory authority granted in paragraph (c)(6) permits the writing of rules
which negate arrangements desiped to avoid surrogate foreign corporation
status in form but not substance. This is clearly indicated by the examples
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.957-l(b)(2) (as amended in 1997).
41 I.R.C. § 7874(c)(6), (g) (2006). An IRS official confirmed in a public forum that the
grants of regulatory authority were important factors in the decision. See John Merrick,
Special Counsel, I.R.S. Office of Assoc. Chief Counsel, Remarks at the American Bar
Association Section of Taxation meeting (Sept. 25, 2009), in TAx ANALYSTS, 2009 WTD
186-2 (Sept. 29, 2009).
42 I.R.C. § 7874(c)(4) (2006).
43 I.R.C. § 7874(b)(6)
4 I.R.C. § 7874(c)(6).
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stated in paragraph (c)(6) itself, namely regulations "to treat warrants,
options, contracts to acquire stock, convertible debt interests, and other
similar interests as stock, and ... to treat stock as not stock."A5 It follows
that the Notice's treatment of the 79%-21% case as an 80%-20% case is not
authorized by paragraph (c)(6) in a case where the former owners' 100%
interest in the group was, in substance, diluted to a 79% equity interest.
Second, is the authority to make rules "to prevent the avoidance of the
purposes of the section" broad enough to support the Notice? The purposes
of the section are indicated by the language of the section, read purposively
in light of the legislative history. The fact that the statute explicitly
provides for the disregard of stock sold in a public offering but not stock
sold in a private placement is not conclusive, but it does create a need for
the IRS and Treasury to show that Congressional intent would be defeated
by respecting stock issued in exchange for cash to one or more new
investors through a private placement. The IRS and Treasury have to be
able to hang their hat on relevant language in either the statute or the
legislative history when they exercise their authority to write anti-avoidance
regulations.
Congress said that section 7874 was intended to discourage inversions
of U.S. parent entities into new foreign parent corporations having a
minimal presence in the foreign country of incorporation. It classified such
inversions into those having little or no non-tax effect or purpose and those
having enough non-tax effect or purpose to be outside of the first category.
It drew the statutory line between the two categories at 80% continuity of
ownership. An inversion resulting in a real dilution of the former owners'
interest, through a private placement, by more than 20%, regardless of
whether the new investors transfer cash, marketable securities, or some
other form of property to the group in exchange for their stock in the new
foreign parent, appears to have been considered by Congress to have
enough of a non-tax effect to put the transaction into the second category.
Thus, applying section 7874(a)(1) appears to be fully consistent with
Congressional intent as expressed in both the language of the statute and the
legislative history. The broad grant of regulatory authority in section
7874(g) refers to "avoidance of the purposes of the section," not avoidance
of a particular part of the section by making a choice to be subject to
another part of the section. Similarly, section 7874(c)(4) disregards
transfers that are "part of a plan a principal purpose of which is to avoid the
purposes of this section" (emphasis added). The purposes of the section
are not avoided by a plan that contemplates being subject to section
7874(a)(1) due to facts that, in substance, are consistent with what Congress
had in mind when it enacted that provision.
The Notice could also lead to an absurd result in a case in which
45 id.
46 I.R.C. § 7874(c)(4) (2006).
709
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:699 (2010)
investors unrelated to UST had established FC and injected cash into it in
exchange for stock, and, in a connected transaction, FC had acquired the
stock or assets of UST by paying a mixture of cash and FC stock to the
owners of UST. Only the FC stock held by the former UST owners would
be counted in determining continuity of ownership under section 7874, and
FC would be treated as a domestic corporation for U.S. tax purposes, even
if only a tiny percentage of FC was actually owned by the former UST
owners.
Under applicable standards for testing the validity of administrative
regulations, the forthcoming regulations announced in the Notice will be
vulnerable to a challenge. The Chevron standard, which was applied by the
Third Circuit in the IRS's favor in Swallows Holding in 2008, does not
permit the IRS to promulgate an interpretive regulation that conflicts with
the unambiguous language of a statute.47 There does not appear to be any
ambiguity in section 7874 that is being interpreted in the Notice. The term
"public offering" cannot be read as including a private placement by any
stretch of the imagination. A court might take the view, however, that the
grants of regulatory authority in section 7874 have the effect of creating
statutory ambiguity with respect to transactions that arguably are
inconsistent with the purposes of the statute. In that case, the second leg of
the Chevron analysis would require the court to examine the reasonableness
of the agency's rule in light of all relevant evidence as to legislative intent,
including the words of the statute and the legislative history.4 8 For the
reasons discussed above, the regulations announced in the Notice do not
appear to be a reasonable exercise of regulatory authority.
IV. THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES TEST AND TD 9453
In contrast to the bright-line test of 80% ownership in section 7874(b),
the business-activities test in section 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) draws a very fuzzy
line, the crossing of which has enormous consequences. If the group's
business activities in the foreign parent's country of incorporation are
substantial when compared to the total worldwide business activities of the
group, section 7874 does not apply. Unfortunately, the adjective
"substantial" is ambiguous. The American Heritage Dictionary supplies six
different definitions, the most pertinent of which is "considerable in
importance, value, degree, amount, or extent."49 The adjective
47 See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comrn'r, 515 F.3d 162, 167-72 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) passim).
Regulations issued under a grant of authority to write rules to carry out the purposes of a
statute or prevent the avoidance of its purposes are interpretive, not legislative, regulations.
See, e.g., Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 1, 14 (2000) (regarding a regulation
issued under I.R.C. § 460(h)).
48 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
49 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1727 (4th ed. 2000).
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"considerable" is defined as "fairly large in amount, extent, or degree."50
The relevant definition of "fairly" is "moderately" 5 and, in circular fashion,
the relevant definition of "large" is "of considerable size, extent, quantity,
,,52
capacity, or amount.
Thus, the substantiality standard of the business-activities test in
section 7874 appears to require that the group's business activities in FC's
country be of moderately considerable size in comparison to the group's
total worldwide activities. Such a requirement is vague; certainly not
anything like a bright line. It works well enough for the type of inversions
that prompted the enactment of section 7874, where FC is incorporated in
Bermuda and the group has virtually no business in Bermuda. But what if a
group's managers or owners are considering a potential inversion in which
FC would be incorporated in the United Kingdom, and the group's U.K.
activities comprise between 5% and 10% of the group's worldwide
activities? Is that "substantial" when compared to the global business?
What if the U.K. activities were 15% of the global total, or 25%, or 35%?
There is simply no way of knowing where the line is based on the language
of the statute.
For a group that conducts significant business activities in many
different countries, the business-activities test would be impossible to
satisfy if "substantial" were interpreted to mean "at least 50%," or even "at
least 20%." It is likely that many global businesses are spread over a large
number of countries such that no single country accounts for more than a
single-digit percentage of the global business. Did Congress intend to
create a condition that could not be met, in practice, in some cases? There
is no evidence in the legislative history that this result was intended.
Taxpayers have a legitimate expectation that the law will be clear
enough to be followed. Therefore, it is incumbent on the IRS and Treasury
to provide guidance under section 7874 enabling taxpayers to have a
reasonable degree of certainty as to whether the business-activities test
would be satisfied in their case. To that end, the IRS and Treasury issued
regulations on the business-activities test in June 2006.
The regulations included both a general facts-and-circumstances
analysis of the substantiality standard and a safe harbor test. The preamble
stated:
The IRS and Treasury Department believe that this dual approach
appropriately provides taxpayers with the certainty of an objective
and clear safe harbor, while preserving the ability of a taxpayer to
conclude, in a case that is not within the scope of the safe harbor,
s Id. at 392.
51 Id. at 636.
52 Id. at 987.
5 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2T (2006); T.D. 9265, 2006-2 C.B. 1.
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that section 7874 is not applicable to a foreign entity's acquisition of
the stock or assets of a domestic entity where, after the acquisition,
the group has a meaningful and bona fide business presence in the
relevant foreign country.
The heart of the facts-and-circumstances test is the list of factors that
will be considered (or not considered) in making the determination of
substantiality of business activities in the country:
(ii) Factors to be considered ..... Relevant factors include, but are
not limited to-
(A) Historical presence. The conduct of continuous business
activities in the foreign country by [group] members prior to the
acquisition;
(B) Operational activities. Business activities of the [group] in
the foreign country occurring in the ordinary course of the
active conduct of one or more trades or businesses, involving-
(1) Property located in the foreign country which is owned
by members of the [group];
(2) The performance of services by individuals in the
foreign country who are employed by members of the
[group]; and
(3) Sales to customers in the foreign country by [group]
members;
(C) Management activities. The performance in the foreign
country of substantial managerial activities by [group]
members' officers and employees who are based in the foreign
country;
(D) Ownership. A substantial degree of ownership of the
[group] by investors resident in the foreign country.
(E) Strategic factors. The existence of business activities in the
foreign country that are material to the achievement of the
[group's] overall business objectives.ss
Five examples illustrating the application of the facts-and-
circumstances test were included in the regulation.
Under the safe-harbor test, a group would satisfy the substantiality
54 T.D. 9265, 2006-2 C.B. 1.
5 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2T(d)(1)(ii) (2006).
56 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2T(d)(4) (2006).
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standard if FC's country of incorporation accounted for at least 10% of the
group's total employees (by both headcount and compensation), business
assets (excluding intangibles), and sales.
In June 2009, the IRS and Treasury amended the regulations by
eliminating the safe harbor and all of the examples. The preamble to the
amended regulation contains the following comments:
The IRS and the Treasury Department have concluded that the safe
harbor provided by the 2006 temporary regulations may apply to
certain transactions that are inconsistent with the purposes of section
7874, which is meant to prevent certain transactions that seek to
avoid U.S. tax by merely shifting the place of organization of a
domestic corporation (or partnership). The [amended] temporary
regulations, therefore, do not retain the safe harbor provided by the
2006 temporary regulations. The [amended] temporary regulations
also do not retain the examples illustrating the general rule contained
in the 2006 temporary regulations. Thus, taxpayers can no longer
rely on the safe harbor or the examples illustrating the general rule
provided by the 2006 temporary regulations. Instead, taxpayers must
apply the general rule to determine whether the substantial business
activities condition is satisfied. In addition, the question of whether
the substantial business activities condition is satisfied will continue
to be on the list of provisions with respect to which the IRS will not
ordinarily issue rulings or determination letters.59
As discussed earlier in this article, it is impossible for taxpayers to
know, absent guidance from the IRS and Treasury, what "substantial"
means for the purposes of the business-activities test in section 7874. By
eliminating the regulatory safe harbor and the examples of the application
of the facts-and-circumstances test, the IRS and Treasury are abdicating
their responsibility to provide meaningful guidance.
The comments in the preamble are revealing: the purpose of section
7874 is "to prevent certain transactions that seek to avoid U.S. tax by
merely shifting the place of organization of a domestic corporation (or
partnership)." This statement betrays the purposes of the statute, as it
deviates from the legislative history in two ways. First, Congress did not
say that it wished to "prevent" inversions. Rather, it sought to negate or
limit the U.S. tax benefits of tax-motivated inversions, with the tax
consequences varying depending on the level of continuing ownership of
the group. Preventing the owners of a business from reorganizing the legal
entity structure of the business in a legal way would be inconsistent with
5 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2T(d)(2) (2006).
58 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2T (as amended in 2009); T.D. 9453, 2008-28 I.R.B. 114
(2009).
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traditional American notions of freedom. The idea that the U.S. Congress
would attempt to prevent the owners of an American business entity from
transferring their interest in the entity to a foreign entity is untenable.
Second, Congress did not say that section 7874 was aimed at
inversions that merely shift the place of organization of a domestic entity.
Rather, Congress said that section 7874 was intended to apply to "inversion
transactions resulting in a minimal presence in a foreign country of
incorporation." 61 Shifting the place of organization of a domestic entity to a
foreign country of incorporation in which the group has a substantial
presence was always outside the scope of section 7874.
The preamble to the amended regulations arguably misrepresents the
purposes of the statute. A more accurate statement of those purposes would
have highlighted the need for meaningful guidance regarding the business-
activities test.
The guidance that remains in the regulations consists of the non-
exclusive list of factors to be considered in applying the facts-and-
circumstances test. This list is not enough to give taxpayers a reasonably
clear idea of what satisfies the substantiality standard. The elimination of
the 10% safe harbor may be seen as creating an implication that the IRS and
Treasury see the line as being somewhere above the 10% mark, but it
remains impossible to know with certainty without further guidance.
V. THE NEED TO REFORM THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX
REGIME
The House Ways and Means Committee's report on section 7874
indicated that, in the Committee's view, inversions were a symptom of an
underlying problem, namely, "our current uncompetitive system for taxing
U.S.-based global businesses."62 The House version of what became
section 7874 did not seek to treat FC as a domestic corporation under any
circumstances. Rather, the House version sought only to tax the inversion
gain, if the relevant statutory conditions were met. The Committee indeed
considered it appropriate to tax the inversion gain in cases where the
continuing ownership was at least 60% and the group did not have
substantial operations in FC's country of incorporation; yet the Committee
appeared to feel that it was more important for Congress to address the
reasons leading U.S. multinationals to undertake inversion transactions.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 did contain a number of
measures aimed at alleviating the U.S. tax burden on foreign-source income
of U.S. multinationals, such as a reduction in the number of separate
baskets for purposes of determining the foreign tax credit limitation.
61 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 108-755, supra note 19.
62 WILLIAM M. THOMAS, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. REP. No. 108-393, at
163 (2003).
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However, Congress left in place the fundamental framework of the U.S.
international tax regime for domestic corporations conducting global
business. The regime provides for residence-based taxation of global
income subject to a foreign tax credit, with residence being determined
solely by the country of incorporation. The foreign tax credit rules are
highly complicated, requiring a great deal of time and effort to be spent by
expensive specialists on the management of the group's global effective tax
rate. In addition, the foreign-source income of controlled foreign
subsidiaries of a U.S. parent corporation is potentially subject to U.S.
taxation each year under a complex web of anti-deferral rules that also
necessitate substantial time to be spent on tax management.
In comparison, multinational businesses conducted by corporate
groups owned by a non-U.S. parent corporation generally have a lighter tax
compliance burden, and often a lower global effective tax rate as well.6 3
Most OECD countries provide a tax exemption for non-portfolio dividends
from foreign affiliates' earnings that have been subjected to foreign income
tax, thus eliminating the complexities of a foreign tax credit system and
allowing low-taxed foreign-source income to remain low-taxed.64
Moreover, the controlled foreign company rules in other countries are
generally more narrowly targeted than the U.S. subpart F rules." And all
but one OECD member country impose corporate income tax at a lower rate
than the U.S. federal corporate income tax rate.66
The Obama Administration announced a set of international tax
proposals in early May 2009.67 The proposals would significantly increase
the disparity of tax burdens between at least some U.S.-parented global
63 See, e.g., John M. Samuels, American Tax Isolationism, 123 TAX NOTES 1593 (June
29, 2009) at p. 1594:
[T]he U.S. tax system is out of step with the tax system of virtually every major
industrialized country in the world. Twenty-five of the twenty-nine OECD
countries have adopted territorial tax regimes, leaving the United States as the
only major industrialized country taxing the worldwide income of its resident
multinationals. And the average corporate tax rate in OECD countries has
steadily declined and is now 50 percent lower than the U.S. rate. Nor has any
country adopted antideferral rules that are nearly as broad and far-reaching as
the U.S. subpart F regime.
6 Id.
65 The U.K. rules, for example, contain a number of different exclusions, including an
exclusion for any controlled foreign company with respect to which it can be shown that the
company was not created for the purpose of reducing U.K. tax liability. HM Revenue &
Customs Int'l Manual, Controlled Foreign Companies, available at http://www.hmrc.gov.
uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM200000.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
66 Japan has the highest corporate income tax rate among OECD countries, followed
closely by the United States. OECD Tax Database, Table 11.1 (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
67 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., GEN. EXPLANATION OF THE ADMI.'s FIscAL YR. 2010
REvENUE PROPOSALS (MAY 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/gmbk09.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
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groups and their non-U.S.-parented competitors. Deferral of U.S. income
taxation of foreign subsidiaries' foreign-source earnings would be more
difficult under subpart F due to a new rule preventing the use of a check-
the-box election to treat a foreign eligible entity as a disregarded entity for
U.S. tax purposes, except in cases where the single owner of the entity was
a corporation formed under the laws of the same country as the eligible
68thentity. Also, the deduction of expenses (other than research and
development expenses) attributable to foreign-source income would be
deferred until such time as the income was repatriated to the United
States. 69 This would affect mainly the deductibility of worldwide interest
expense as well as general and administrative expenses. A third proposal,
of great significance to many U.S. multinationals, is the calculation of a
U.S. parent's foreign tax credit limitation on the basis of the global pools of
the group's foreign-source income and foreign income taxes. For some
groups, this change would significantly reduce their ability to use the
foreign tax credit to offset residual U.S. taxation of foreign-source income.
These proposals would enlarge and reinforce the differences between
the U.S. international tax system and the international tax systems of U.S.
trading partners; they would strengthen the existing residence-based
taxation of U.S. corporations, in contrast with the international trend toward
territorial taxation of corporate profits. Japan and the United Kingdom, for
example, have recently adopted legislation making their tax rules for
foreign-source dividends more like those of the continental European
countries, which generally provide an exemption for foreign-source
dividends paid out of foreign-taxed earnings.70 In Canada, the Advisory
Panel on Canada's System of International Taxation recommended, in its
final report in December 2008, that the existing exemption system be
broadened to cover all active foreign business income of foreign affiliates,
as well as capital gains from the sale of forein affiliate stock that derives
its value primarily from active business assets.
The Administration's proposals have generated a good deal of
criticism from business groups such as the National Foreign Trade Council
as well as prominent international tax practitioners such as James Fuller and
Michael Durst.72 The gist of their criticism is that the U.S. economy would
68 Id. at 28.
69 Id. at 29.
7o See Charles Gnaedinger, Japanese, U.K. Exemption Systems Could Inform U.S. Tax
Decisions, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (2010), 2010 WTD 40-3, and sources cited therein.
n Advisory Panel on Can.'s Int'l Tax Sys., Final Rep., Enhancing Canada's International
Advantage 4.1 & 4.3 (2008), available at http://www.apcsit-gcrcfi.ca/07/cp-dc/pdf/final
Report eng.pdf.
72 Press Release, Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Addressing Offshore Tax Avoidance
Without Harming the International Competitiveness of U.S. Businesses (2009),
http://www.nftc.org/default/Tax%20Policy/International%2OTax/Final%20NFTC%20Paper
%20addressing/o20tax%20haven%20issues.pdf; James P. Fuller, US. Tax Review, 54 TAX
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be better off in the medium- to long-term if U.S. multinationals were
subject to a more benign regime of residence-based taxation, given the
ability of global businesses to move activities, investments, and people to
other countries where tax costs are lower. As noted by the Canadian
advisory panel, empirical studies indicate that outbound foreign direct
investment by resident companies is more likely to help than to hurt the
economy of the country of residence in the long term.73 The
Administration's proposals are based on the conflicting view that overseas
investment b7y U.S. companies deprives the U.S. economy of jobs as well as
tax revenue.
Section 7874 is the most extreme of the U.S. international tax rules
aimed at preserving residence-based taxation of foreign-source earnings of
U.S. multinationals. The deemed domestication of a foreign corporation
not managed and controlled in the United States, under the 80% ownership
change test of section 7874, is a radical assertion of tax jurisdiction in the
context of international tax norms. The only conceivable justification for
such treatment is that the new FC parent structure has no meaning or
purpose other than the avoidance of U.S. income taxation, and is a mere
alter ego of the former U.S. parent company (as the use of the term
"surrogate" in the statute suggests). Whether this is likely to be true in any
given case is doubtful, but even if it were true, a question would remain as
to whether the imposition of residence-based taxation on a nonresident
corporation for the indefinite future is appropriate.
The U.S. does not have a similarly broad deemed-domestication rule
for individuals who cease to be subject to worldwide federal income
taxation by relinquishing their citizenship or permanent residency rights.
Rather, they are subject to tax on unrealized gains at the time of
expatriation, and to tax on future gains from the sale of certain U.S.-
connected assets under a special re-sourcing rule. Such treatment is
similar to what section 7874 provides for U.S. businesses in the event of an
inversion involving a 60%-to-80% ownership change.
The U.S. international tax regime would be improved by the repeal of
the deemed-domestication rule of section 7874(b), as part of a wider range
NOTES INT'L 773 (2009); Michael C. Durst, The President's International Tax Proposals in
Historical and Economic Perspective, 54 TAX NOTES INT'L 747 (2009).
7 Margit Molnar, Nigel Pain & Daria Taglioni, The Internationalisation of Production,
International Outsourcing and Employment in the OECD (OECD Econ. Dept., Working
Paper No. 561, 2007); P.S. Andersen & P. Hainaut, Foreign Direct Investment and
Employment in the Industrial Countries (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 61,
1998).
74 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing
Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas (May 4, 2009) 2009
WL 1179547 ("Today, President Obama and Secretary Geithner ... are calling for reforms
to ensure that our tax code does not stack the deck against job creation here on our shores.").
71 I.R.C. §§877, 877A.
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of international tax reforms designed to bring the U.S. system closer to
those of the other OECD countries. The United States is no longer the
dominant economic and political force in the world that it was in the latter
half of the twentieth century. The globalization of business has taken place
in a world in which capital and people are increasingly mobile. Like King
Canute trying to hold back the tide, the U.S. government is attempting to
use tax rules such as section 7874(b) to prevent global businesses from
adopting legal-entity structures that legitimately minimize their global
effective tax costs. It will not work, and is not worth the attempt.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The 2009 guidance regarding section 7874 was developed by the IRS
and Treasury at roughly the same time as the Administration's international
tax proposals. Those proposals, if enacted, would make the tax cost of
having a U.S. parent entity higher than ever for many multinational
groups. 76 At the same time, the financial crisis and recession of 2008 and
2009 may have reduced the U.S. tax cost of expatriating to a new foreign
parent through an inversion transaction falling under section 7874(a)(1).
For some group owners, the effective transfer of more than 20 percent of
their equity interest in the group to new investors via a private placement of
FC stock, and the U.S. tax cost of the related inversion, would be acceptable
trade-offs for the future benefits to be derived from positioning the group
outside the increasingly onerous U.S. international tax rules.
The language and legislative history of section 7874 do not indicate
that Congress intended to have the new foreign parent treated as a domestic
corporation in that scenario. There is simply no valid legal basis for
disregarding FC stock issued to new investors in exchange for cash in a
private placement.
For groups considering an inversion resulting in a new foreign parent
in a country in which the group has existing and continuing business
activities (perhaps in a country such as Ireland or Singapore), the
elimination of the safe-harbor test and the examples in the regulations
regarding the business-activities test of section 7874, and the no-ruling
position of the IRS, mean that a group would have to undertake the
inversion without knowing whether section 7874 would apply." The
inability to know the tax consequences of a major transaction is a real
76 See James Reardon & Jon Ohm, The Practical Effects of the Obama International Tax
Proposals, 2009 TAx NoTEs TODAY 171-6 (2009).
" The IRS and Treasury have created uncertainty with respect to other issues under
section 7874 as well. For a discussion, see PricewaterhouseCoopers, US Inbound Newsalert,
Tax Consequences of Cross-Border Restructurings of Domestic Corporations and
Partnerships Less Certain with New Temporary Regulations under Section 7874 (June 22,
2009), available at http://www.publications.pwc.com/DisplayFile.aspx?Attachmentid=
2202& Mailinstanceid=11696.
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problem, which only the IRS and Treasury (or Congress) can solve. The
sooner the IRS and Treasury can produce new guidance regarding the level
of business activity in the foreign country of incorporation that will be
considered "substantial" when compared to the total business activities of
the group, the better for all concerned.
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